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REROUTED ON THE WAY TO APPRENDI-LAND:
BOOKER, RITA, AND THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION
SAM KAMIN
t
Just five years ago, Justice Antonin Scalia could barely contain his
giddiness at the ascendance of the Apprendi revolution that he had
helped lead. That revolution had begun in 2000 in Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey' with the Court's landmark Sixth Amendment holding that "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."Q Two years later, the
Court decided in Ring v. Arizona3 that the Sixth Amendment, as inter-
preted by Apprendi, required the overturning of capital sentences that
relied upon judicial fact-finding.4 The argument at which Justice Scalia
had first hinted in his 1998 Almendarez-Torres v. United States5 dissent
had become the law of the land, and there seemed to be no logical stop-
ping point to the revolution's scope.
Writing separately in concurrence with the result in Ring, Scalia
chastised those who had not yet appreciated the extent of this reshaping
of how criminals are sentenced in the United States. He singled out for
his scorn Justice Breyer, who had concurred in the Ring result on sepa-
rate grounds,6 informing his Brother that there was only one legitimate
way to arrive at the appropriate result in the case:
There is really no way in which Justice Breyer can travel with the
happy band that reaches today's result unless he says yes to Ap-
prendi. Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he
t Associate Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver; B.A., Amherst Col-
lege, 1992; J.D., University of California-Berkeley, 1996; Ph.D., University of California-Berkeley,
2000. 1 would like to thank the organizers of this survey for the opportunity to participate and the
authors who agreed to contribute articles.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id.
3. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4. Id.
5. 523 U.S. 224, 258 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the end, the Court cannot credibly
argue that the question whether a fact which increases maximum permissible punishment must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is an easy one.").
6. Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Given my views in Apprendi v. New
Jersey... I cannot join the Court's opinion. I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe
that jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment.").
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should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Ap-
prendi-land.
7
Scalia's tone was that of the dissident finally come to power; his views,
once eccentric, had become ascendant.
When the Supreme Court overturned Washington state's sentencing
guidelines in 2004 in Blakely v. Washington,8 the flight to Apprendi-land
was nearing its destination. It now seemed only a matter of time before
the Supreme Court completed its undoing of modem sentencing regimes
by invalidating the granddaddy of those regimes: the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. In her Blakely dissent, Justice O'Connor anticipated this
result, her tone nearly as despondent as Scalia's was celebratory in Ring:
"What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sen-
tencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judg-
ments are in jeopardy." 9
However, it now seems quite possible that those without tickets to
Apprendi-land will have the last laugh. As expected, the Supreme Court
decided in United States v. Booker 0 in 2005 that the view of the Sixth
Amendment adopted in Apprendi and Blakely required the invalidation
of the federal Guidelines as written."1 However a separate majority of
five Justices crafted a remedy for the constitutional infirmity of the
Guidelines that threatened to undo much of what Justice Scalia and his
fellow-travelers had so carefully crafted.
12
Writing for this remedial majority, Justice Breyer defined the ques-
tion for the Court as one of congressional intent: What would Congress
want done if it knew that its sentencing scheme based on judges finding
facts and then sentencing within fixed ranges based upon those facts
were found unconstitutional? He concluded that Congress's preference
would be to keep the Guidelines in place as written and make them advi-
sory rather than mandatory.' 3 Furthermore, Justice Breyer acknowledged
that making the Guidelines merely advisory would necessitate the crea-
tion of a new standard of appellate review of criminal sentences. 14 He
7. Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
9. Id. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
11. Id. at 226-27.
12. Id. at 245, 259. Justice Ginsburg changed sides, forming the fifth vote for both the consti-
tutional majority and the remedial majority. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83
DENV. U.L. REV. 665, 678 (2006).
13. In doing so, Justice Breyer rejected the possibility of invalidating the Guidelines in their
entirety (and allowing judges to sentence within the minima and maxima set by federal statute) and
maintaining the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but engrafting Apprendi's jury fact finding
requirement to them (the approach preferred by Justice Stevens's opinion).
14. Prior to Booker, sentences within the Guidelines were evaluated for correctness; those
outside the guideline range were reviewed to determine whether the sentence "is unreasonable."
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
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concluded for the remedial majority that the sentences that trial judges
impose under the newly advisory Guidelines ought to be reviewed for
reasonableness. 15
Thus, Booker was clearly a change in the Court's direction; Ap-
prendi, Ring, and Blakely all trumpeted the role of the jury in sentencing,
while the juror is strangely missing from the remedial opinion in Booker.
What was far less clear after Booker was where sentencing in the United
States was headed. Would Booker mark the return of the judge as sen-
tencer, freeing trial judges from the yoke of the Guidelines so many of
them found so oppressive? Or would Justice Breyer's solution merely
become the Guidelines by another name: Would the new "advisory"
Guidelines become mandatory in practice? Would Congress step in to
correct the remedial majority's assumption regarding its intent? To vali-
date that assumption? Furthermore, how would reasonableness review
work in practice? What weight would be placed on the "advisory"
guideline range in determining whether a particular sentence was reason-
able? Would the same weight be placed on the guideline range if the
sentence was within the "advisory" range as if it was outside of that
range? Would reasonableness depend on proximity to the "advisory"
range?
This confusion was essentially the state of the law at the time Rita v.
United States was decided on June 21st of this year.' 6 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Rita in order to determine whether an appel-
late presumption of reasonableness (which had been adopted by several
of the circuits and rejected by others) was consistent with the remedial
opinion in Booker.17  The Court, with only Justice Souter dissenting,
concluded that such an appellate presumption was permissible. Writing
for the majority once again, Justice Breyer reasoned that Congress had
instructed both the Sentencing Commission and the federal district courts
to weigh a number of factors in determining the appropriate sentence for
particular conduct. Where both the Commission and the trial judge agree
on a sentence-that is, where the judge sentences within the suggested
sentencing range-it is permissible for an appellate court to presume that
the sentence is a reasonable one.
15. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). Justice Breyer's remedial decision in
Booker has not proven popular in the two years since it was issued. In this survey, Professor Doug-
las Berman states: "Justice Breyer created this remedy in Booker out of whole cloth with only a nod
to applicable constitutional, statutory and administrative laws." Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned
Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 7, 10 (2007). Others have been less
charitable: See, e.g., Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State
of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625 (2007); McConnell, supra note
12, at 666.
16. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2456. Rita's companion case, Claiborne v. United States, was dis-
missed as moot after the defendant died following oral argument. 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007).
17. 177 Fed. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3 2006).
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In this symposium we have five different perspectives on the state
of federal sentencing after Rita. Professor Douglas Berman leads off
with a taxonomy of the legal issues raised by the opinions in Booker and
how those issues stand post-Rita. Berman writes that in Rita, "the Su-
preme Court was genuinely eager to provide [] guidance to lower courts
about how they should administer an advisory federal guideline sentenc-
ing system. Unfortunately [] various passages throughout the Rita opin-
ions raise new questions about the major federal sentencing issues that
the Booker remedy stirred up."' 8 Berman concludes that, however the
Supreme Court resolves the various and sundry questions remaining after
Booker and Rita, "the history of modem sentencing reforms demon-
strates that changes in legal doctrines have become revolutionary only
when they ultimately transformed the legal cultures in which these doc-
trines operate."'
' 9
Following this recognition that it is actual outcomes that ultimately
matter, Paul J. Hofer, the former Senior Research Associate at the United
States Sentencing Commission, provides us with a wealth of data on an
important empirical question raised by Rita: "Does an appellate pre-
sumption of reasonableness for sentences within the guideline range have
an effect on the outcomes of appeals or on sentences imposed by the
district courts? '20 Although Hofer concedes that the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the legal import of this empirical question,2' it remains
crucial both in understanding the impact (or lack of impact) that Booker
and Rita will have on actual federal sentencing outcomes and in crafting
doctrine to govern that sentencing. While the Supreme Court largely
ignored the "daunting" statistical briefing in Rita, Hofer remains optimis-
tic about the role that empirical research can play in this process.
Could it be that the Rita Court is inviting the lower courts to hear
evidence that particular Guidelines are not working to achieve the
statutory purposes? Only time, and perhaps the upcoming opinion in
Kimbrough, will tell. If it turns out the Court is now open to categori-
cal challenges of the type many commentators have long encouraged,
Rita may be just the beginning of empirical evidence on sentencing
questions presented to the Court.
22
We turn then from these academic analyses of the state of sentenc-
ing to the views of those actually engaged in the practice. First, a federal
district judge and his clerk "urge district courts to exercise the discretion
18. Berman, supra note 15, at 15.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L.
REv. 27, 28 (2007).
21. Id. at 30 ("[T]he [appellate presumption of reasonableness], even if it increases the likeli-
hood that the judge, not the jury, will find 'sentencing facts,' does not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment.") (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465).
22. Id. at 50 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007), cert. granted, 60
U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-6330)).
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[Rita] reaffirms. 23 While some might read Booker and Rita as at least
implicitly re-imposing the Guidelines on trial judges, the Hon. Lynn
Adelman and Jon Deitrich argue in their essay that Rita in fact encour-
ages trial judges to use their discretion to determine the appropriate sen-
tence. They argue that the Court went out of its way in Rita to limit its
holding and to avoid re-instituting the Guidelines on trial judges: The
Court held that circuits may, but are not required to, adopt the presump-
tion of reasonableness for sentences within the guideline range; that cir-
cuits may not adopt a presumption of unreasonableness for out-of-range
sentences; and that the reasonableness presumption that it approved is an
appellate presumption, not a trial one.24 Adelman and Deitrich remind us
that most federal judges on the bench today "have little or no sentencing
experience except under mandatory Guidelines," 25 and that the present
circumstances create the first real opportunity in a generation for trial
judges to create a "common law of sentencing": "[Federal trial judges]
can only do this by exercising their discretion to impose non-guideline
sentences and by explaining their reasons for doing so."'26 Such discre-
tion, the authors argue, has the power to overcome many of the injustices
so often associated with the Guidelines.
The other sentencing judge in our symposium views the future far
less optimistically than does Judge Adelman. For Judge Nancy Gertner,
the fear is that "'presumptive' will, once again, slide to 'mandatory,' or
something short of that, namely, 'Guidelines-Lite. ' ' 27  Judge Gertner
worries that the gravitational pull of the reasonableness presumption
approved by the Rita Court will discourage trial courts from thinking
beyond the parameters of the Guidelines. Using the facts of Rita itself,
she critiques the Supreme Court's assertion that the reasonableness pre-
sumption is appropriate for a sentence within the guideline range because
in such a case the Sentencing Commission and the trial court have agreed
on the appropriate sentence. More likely, Judge Gertner argues, when a
judge sentences within the guideline range, she has merely acquiesced to
the guideline sentence without independently examining it.
[T]he fact that a district court's sentence is aligned with that of the
Commission does not necessarily indicate that there was careful re-
flection about what the appropriate sentence should have been, but
may simply reflect a judge's good faith effort to comply with the
Guidelines (knowing their traction even post-Booker) or the failure of
effective advocacy at sentencing .... The "gravitational pull" of the
Guidelines, particularly in a circuit that is amenable to the "Guide-
23. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal
Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 51 (2007).
24. Id. at 52-53.
25. Id. at 54.
26. Id. at 55.
27. Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How to Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENV. U. L.
REv. 63, 71 (2007).
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lines as presumptive" approach, limits sentencing arguments, stops
meaningful critique of the Guidelines, and encourages cursory treat-
ment of the sentence on all levels, at trial and on appeal.28
Finally, we get the perspective of a federal appellate judge on a Su-
preme Court opinion that the Court emphasized was entirely about appel-
late presumptions rather than trial ones. Judge Jeffrey Sutton ends this
survey on an optimistic note. He argues that "if an utterly indeterminate
sentencing regime slights consistency and if an overly determinate sen-
tencing regime slights individualized sentencing, it may be that Booker
and Rita present an opportunity to thread the sentencing needle., 29 This
needle-threading, he argues, will require collaboration between trial and
appellate judges within the federal system; trial judges have been en-
trusted by Congress with the task of determining appropriate sentences in
individual cases, and appellate judges, by virtue of their smaller number
and supervisory position, are well-situated to prevent extreme disparities
in like cases.
What the contributions to this volume emphasize is the triumph of
legal realism. The authors focus not so much on doctrine as on how that
doctrine will be applied by the actors who actually make the decisions
about the futures of criminal defendants. For all of Justice Scalia's en-
thusiasm for the Apprendi revolution, that revolution will not fail be-
cause Justice Ginsburg changed her vote in Booker to join Justice
Breyer's remedial majority. Rather, the flight to Apprendi-land was re-
routed because the Supreme Court, for all of its power to say what the
law is, has very little power to change what happens in individual court-
rooms every day. It is the collective efforts of all of the various players
in the sentencing puzzle-trial judges, appellate judges, Congress, the
Sentencing Commission-rather than any edict from the Supreme Court
that will ultimately determine the future direction of sentencing in the
federal courts.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and Rita,
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 81 (2007).
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